Back haul problems occur in many areas of transportation. One-way rental often takes equipment, such as cases and containers, from an area of high demand to an area of low demand. The problem is to return the equipment to the location of need, a problem typically viewed as an admimstrative and scheduling problem. We developed a decentrali7cd approach in which a specially designed market organizes competition and information to minimize the cost of back-hauls without the direct intervention of administrative negotiations or comm,mdand-control types of scheduling. We employed laboratory experimental methods to test the concept, examine its performance against thcorellcal benchmarks, and explore its limitations. (Trn11sportntion: costs. Games/group decisions: bidding/auctions.) 
T he back-haul problem is well known to management in many areas of transportation. The problem occurs when using equipment causes its relocation, and it must be relocated before it can be used again. Getting the equipment back to where it is needed is costly. For example, a customer who rents an international freight container or a moving truck may return it at a distant location. The owner may be able to rent it to another customer at its new location. ! Iowever, if no current demand exists at the return location, the owner may need to back-haul rental units to a location that ha'3 sufficient demand. Naturally occurring patterns of trade can create situations in which back-haul is common.
When the owner of the rental units is also the owner of the least-cost transportation, the back-haul problem is merely one of optimization by a single agent. However, if the owner of the rental units must contract for the transportation from a number of providers, the owner must try to attain a least-cost outcome. Classically, analysts consider the problem from the point of view of uncertainties and the complexities of scheduling. They consider the problem from the point of view of a single decision maker who formulates the problem on the best information avmlable and makes a decision. By contrast we outline a process for making such decisions whose heart is a new, decentralized, smart auction process. Here the problem include<; the complexity of asymmetric information in that only the transportation providers know the costs.
The competition and self-selection features of auctions provide practical advantages. The term smart auction refers to an auction in which a computer solves the complex combinatorial problem implicit in back-haul problems and reports the potential winning bidders. We tested the feasibility of the idea by applying new experimental techniques found in laboratory experimental economics.
The problem has two central features. First, the equipment owner might achieve the most efficient back-haul through some combination of several different transportation providers, each of which moves only part of the stock to be moved. Second, the firm that wants to procure the back-haul services does not know the providers' costs. The first feature implies that the cost-minimizing allocation will require some combination of appropriately coordinated service providers. The second feature implies that the equipment owner must use some form of competition to minimize costs. The use of smart-market competition in this context is new. For previous smart-market designs, see Rassenti et al. (1982) , McCabe et al. (1987) , Banks et al. (1989) , Olson and Porter (1994) , Brewer and Plott (1996) , as well as Plott and Porter (1996) , and Brewer (1999) for other examples of combinatorial auctions. We designed a smart market to solve these two problems in the back-haul environment, in addition to other problems that surface in environments in which a competitive equilibrium does not exist.
Intuitively the process will operate through iterative periods of competition in which competing sellers will adjust their services and charges to fit into a least-cost combination of transportation charges when meshed with the buyer's cost-savings information. The buyer (rental company) posts a cost function giving the costs it faces if the equipment is not moved. These costs are a sum of storage costs at sink locations and opportunity costs for missed rentals at source locations. The sellers (transportation providers) then participate in a continuous iterative bidding process that resembles a first-price procurement auction. Sellers determine and post asking prices for moving units, which depend on their costs of transportation along particular routes. A computer evaluates these offers in light of the buyer's cost function and announces a set of potential winners and losers. The process continues until no seller wishes to ask a lower price for its transportation services. At that point, the potential allocation becomes the actual allocation, and sellers collect on their transportation contracts.
We considered three fundamental questions. First, how can we formally represent the process? Since this 14 is not an auction of the usual sort, its dimensions must be made clear. Second, how can we define the process in operational terms? Exactly what do the participants know, and exactly how does the auction work? Third, will it do what it is supposed to do? Since we test the auction using laboratory experimental techniques, we need some explanation of how to apply these techniques and what we can Jearn from their application.
Laboratory Test-Bed Methodology
The use of labortory experimental techniques to test new types of processes is rapidly gaining popularity. The idea is to create and in1plement prototypes of the process in laboratory environments. Individuals motivated by financial incentives compete under conditions that the experimenter controls and understands.
Such an exercise addresses several important issues. First, by constructing a prototype, the experimenter gives a concrete and operational incarnation to the ideas that support the process. That is, he or she replaces abstract concepts with real things and demonstrates that the concepts have an internal consistency. Second, the experimenter can study the operations of the process and determine whether the process performed as it was supposed to perform. It is a type of proof of principle. Third, the experimenter can examine design consistency, asking whether the results are understandable in terms of the basic principles used in the design of the process or if the results are due to lucky chance. The role of design consistency in evaluating market prototypes is becoming established (Plott 1994) . A process that is to be scaled up to a business level should work for the right reasons; otherwise, the results may not survive the scaling. Finally, obtaining these answers from laboratory experimental methods is inexpensive. The experimenter will discover badly conceived, incompletely conceived, or internally inconsistent processes at little cost relative to field tests. He or she can expose processes based on unreliable principles through inexpensive tests. Test beds provide a first pass at developing new methods of doing business.
Plott (1994) described the basic test-bed approach to testing allocation mechanisms. Brewer and Plott (1996) BREWER AND PLOTT
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successfully applied the approach to the BICAP auction for access to railroad tracks, and Plott and Porter (1996) applied it to auctions for access to NASA spacestation resources. A number of additional studies generally fit the notion of the test-bed approach, even if the word te.st-bed docs not appear explicitly in the language of the research. These include Grether et a!. ( 1989) , Rassenti ct al. (1982) for airport slots allocation; McCabe et al. (1987 McCabe et al. ( , 1989 for smart markets integrating the production, delivery, and transportation of gas and electricity; Banks eta!. (1989) for contingency planning; and Olson and Porter (1994) for 1:1 slotassignment problems, such as their example of assigning research groups to radio-telescope slots.
To provide some additional background on test beds, we will focus on two examples. Both the traintracks and spacc·station studies concern a shared facility, a set of specific feasibility constraints (only certain combinations of trains or projects can share the tracks or the station successfully), and a set of users whose value for using the facility varies and is not known to a central coordinator responsible for administering access to the facility. This particular collection of problem features is known as a primte values em.
•t· ronment within the literature of the economics of mechanism design.
In each case, the question was whether some particular well-defined market or auction mechanism could coordinate the users and their privately held information about their values of using the facility to achieve a high efficiency of use for the facility. Put an other way, what mechanism would tend to grant access to the users who value access the most? A body of economic theory existed that suggested that certain auction or market mechanisms could ideally yield the desired outcomes. Stakeholders in these facilities, however, had their own idea<; about what allocation mechanisms should or should not be implemented, and one argument always voiced against new mechanisms was the lack of available data. The test-bed methodology was one means of securing information about the vi ability of economic processes that had never before been attempted or compared.
In the case of rail (Brewer and Plott 1996) , the proof of principle provided by laboratory auction data from INli:.RFACI:S Vol. 12, No. 5, September-October 2002 a prototype auction helped to rebut arguments in Sweden that auction-based processes were incompatible with rail scheduling. Design-consistcnc:y analyses of the dynamics of bidding showed not only that bidding was efficient, but also that it was efficient for reasons underpinning its design (particularly the ability of the mechanism to take into account the opporttmity cost of awarding a given train route and the ability of agents to collaboratively bid away from certain kinds of bad outcomes). Because of these arguments the Swedes increased their study of auctions (Nilsson 1999) , as did the Dutch (Cox et al. 2002) .
In the case of the space station, Plott and Porter (1996) compared the performance of two markets and auction-based mechanisms wtth a pnority-based administrative procedure similar to NASA's. The new mechanisms, within the laboratory test bed, offered improved utilization and efficiency of resour<.es and even allowed for new methods of contmgency planning as suggested by Banks et al. (1989) . Design consistency analyses showed that the competitive mechanisms functioned in accordance with the competitive models underpinning their design, and also that the administrative procedures NASA used fit the models as well. That is, the NASA administrative procedures performed poorly not by chance, but because they were not, in the language of the economic models, incentive compatible. In fact, it was to agents' advantage to shade the truth and to subvert the administrative processes in certain ways (for example, demanding more than they needed, expectmg to be scaled back) and these tactics could also be observed in operation in the test-bed comparisons. One result of this research was a decision by NASA to create a private online bartering market for mission Cassini resources and to allow this market to largely dictate the design of the spacecraft. The design NASA finally used was somewhat different from the designs studted by Plott and Porter (1996) , but the test-bed methodology clearly played a role in convincing NASA to attempt such a radically different procedure for mission design.
More formally, test beds involve tlm.~e clements. The first is an environment that contains the economic parameters of a model economic problem that is to be solved. The back-haul problem is a type of privatecosts environment. This is similar to the private-values environments of the rail and NASA studies, except that the private information is the costs of agents taking certain actions rather than agents' values of access to a facility. The second element is the mechanism that is to be implemented-the prototype auction process. Third is the set of criteria or performance measures by which the mechanism's performance is to be evaluated, together with existing ideas about why the mechanism might perform as expected.
In the back-haul case, we used four benchmarks to evaluate performance. The first is the lowest-cost possibility, which is the case of vertical integration in which the purchasing firm has all of the cost functions of all providers and nlso has the power to administer what they do. The second benchmark is a monopsony, in which the purchasing firm knows all the providers' costs but must use s imilar payment terms for all providers. We consider two cases, single price and nonlinear pricing, for the monopsony, w hich chooses prices strategically to obtain low costs. The third is the competitive model in w hich the derived demand from the firm's cost savings is in equilibrium with providers' marginal cost of transportation. The final benchmark involves sequential contracts, with the buyer meeting with the transportation providers in sequence and, at each meeting, arranging a contract that maximizes total s urplus in a myopic, nonforward-looking, fashion. These benchmarks represent difficult challenges. Each assumes either that the buyer has informa tion or powers that it does not have or that competitive or strategic processes can operate in a way that is a bit unusual when one buyer deals with only a few sellers.
Background, Notation, and Concepts
We will roughly define a class of transportation environments in terms sufficient to explore the economic issues involved without providing too much detail.
A transportation problem that is trivial in size exemplifies the features of many transport-management problems (Figure 1 ). Two locations, A and B, have product to be picked up, and two locations, D and E, are empty and waiting for product to be delivered. The properties of each location can be described with three parameters: a capacity K, the current stock L, and the target level T. Capacity K and stock level L are physical 16 properties. In contrast, the desired target level T depends on the economic property of a location as a pickup or delivery location and on local business conditions (which we take to be exogenous).
The principal's target is to have the entire stock at warehouses A (30 units) and B (30 units) picked up and delivered to the empty warehouses at locations D and E, which can each hold 30 units.
Agents
Two classes of agents operate in the environment: a ~in gle principal agent (denoted P) and several transportationprovider agents (each denoted t,). A class of agents is defined in terms of their economic roles and the technology and information they possess.
The principal agent P owns the goods in the warehouses at locations A, B, 0 , and E. The principal agent knows the capacities, current stock, and target levels at each warehouse and knows the costs of failing to meet target levels of units. The principal agent cannot move units and must contract with transportationprovider agents to move the units.
The transportation agents face certain costs for moving units, which vary from agent to agent and from
Pickup Locations
Delivery Locatiom
Figure 1: We chose this prototypical back-haul problem as our experl· mental test bed . There are four locations labeled A, B, 0, and E. (As C often designates a cost function, we avoid using lito label a location.) Each location has a current stock level L, a capacity K, and a target (or desired) level T. For example, the figure could represent a supplv of empty ocean-freight containers at A and B, where there is excess supplv. that need to be returned to 0 and E, where thev could be rented to new customers.
BREWER AND PLOIT Back Haul Tralbi'Orlal io11 Problems route to route. These costs are generally private information known only to the agents. To facilitate an exp loratiOn of the general features of back-haul problems, we avoid specifying any particular functional forms for agents' costs.
The Principal Agent's Management Problem
The principal agent tries to solve a cost-minimization problem of the following form:
Choose a transportation strategy to minimize principal's total cost = cost of moving units + cost of unmoved units with respect to constraints:
(1) at each pickup location, units picked up cannot exceed total stock of umts;
(2) at each delivery location, units delivered cannot exceed warehouse capacity K; (3) total tmits picked up must equal total units delivered.
To choose t1 transportation strategy, the principal agent chooses ho"" many units to move at each location. This chotec, along with the initial stock at each location, determines the level of stock at each location The principal agent faces a trade-off behveen costs for moving units and costs for not meeting targets. The constraints upon the principal are essentially that units cannot be created or destroyed (total pickups cannot exceed <;;tack, and total pickups must equal total deliveries) and that the warehouse capacities cannot be exceeded.
The complexity of this problem is suggested by the numerous variables on which the moving costs and the unmoved costs might depend. Clearly, the cost of moving units depends on the number moved and also upon the details of negotiation between the principal and the transportation providers.
Some initial insight into the problem can be obtained by separating the details of routing from the resulting movements. Distinguishing behveen these notions results in certain simplifications. An essential feature of back-haul en\-ironments seems to be that demand depends only upon movements, while supply depends upon the details of routing. Understanding thi.., feature of back-haul environments is crucial to auction design and to creating theoretical performance benchmarks.
Principal's Choices: Movements vs. Routing
The principal must choose how many units to move at each location, specifying a movement vector or a rout ing vector. 
Properties of the Test-Bed Environment
We usc simple properties to summari~e this broad class of transportation environment based on noticing what components of the principal's or the transporta· tion provider's cost depend on moving versus routing vectors. Figure 2: There are many ways to achieve the target movement vector (-20,-25,30, 15 
The Experimental Test Bed
The arrangement of pickup and drop-off locations is the same as shown in Figure Agent., have the same role they did in the example, only now we will specify the number of transportation agents and their cost functions for moving units. A principal agent P wishes to obtain transportation from 12 transport agents t 1 .•• t 12 . Thus I = set of agents = {P, t 1 , t 2 , ••. , td.
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The Principal's Cost Parameters
The principal's cost function is
where MT is the target movement vector and M is the movement vector the princtpal agent chooses. The cost of moving units depends generally on prices paid to the transportation agents. Prices for moving the units will be determined in the experiments using a bidding mechanism. We chose the cost of unmoved units, C)\nmo,·t>d(MT -M), for this initial series of experiments, to have the following quadratic form:
We chose a quadratic because it would be easy for experimental subjects to understand and because it has reasonable marginal-cost properties. (This means that we do not need to develop additional software for laboratory subjects to explain or demonstrate the principal's cost function. If we used more complex functions in our test bed, such additional software tools might become necessary so that subjects could eastly determine the consequences of various what-if scenarios.) Quadratic functions are good approximations in that they reflect many of the complicating factors of more general functions. With a quadratic, the marginal cost of an additional unmoved unit is an increasing function of the number of unmoved units at any location. As more and more containers remain unmO\ed, it will be more expensive (at the margin) to find storage for them at sink locations A and B, or to find replacement containers (or otherwise compensate) at source locations D and E. We chose the cost functions of the various transportation agents as unrecognizable pieces of a linear total supply function (Table 2) . Let _[v] be the largest integer less than or equal to v (that is, rounding down).
The Transportation Agents' Cost Parameters
Then the aggregate supply functions for the various routes arc the following:
Because we give the cost functions to subjects in the form of a short, simple table, we could have chosen any functions for the mdtvidual and, hence, the aggregate costs. We chose unrecognizable individual costs but linear aggregate costs as a means of testing the mechanism. Will competition in this mechanism act to generate linear supply? If it does, then tt does so even though no agent realizes this to be the case. Calculating some of the benchmarks was made easier in the case of linear supply, though we do not provide details of fNTtRFACES Vol. 32, No.5, September-October 2002 these calculations. In addition, the way we distributed the supply functions among the transportation providers incorporates some purposefully chosen peculiarities that would be useful to a buyer who can set prices in an ultimatum-like fashion (a monopsonist). These technicalities are, for the most part, beyond the scope of the paper but dbtinguish two of the monopsony benchmarks (one price vs. nonlinear pricing).
The Combinatorial Back-Haul Auction Mechanism
The following set of rules describes the combinatorial back-haul (CB) auction:
(1) At each point in time, each transportation agent in the auction may have ex.actly one standing ask of the form A, (t, P, M;A, M, 6 , M, 0 , M, 1 ), where P, is the price agent t, asks to remo\'e M,A units from location A, to remove M; 6 units from loc.1tion B, to deliver M,c_ umts to location C, and to deliver M, 0 units to location D.
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(3) At each point in the auction, a computer calculates the set of asks that minimizes total costs to the principal agent P. This set of asks is called the potential allocation, and the cost to the principal agent is called the potential principal cost. The potential allocation and potential principal cost information is sent to the participants.
(4) An agent ti is allowed to replace his ask Ai with a new ask A,* only if it does not increase the potential principal cost.
(5) If T 0 seconds elapse without an acceptable new ask from some agent, the auction concludes. The potential allocation becomes the final transportation contract. The principal must pay the transportation agents, and these agents must deliver the transportation services.
A central computer oversees the rules of the procurement auction. The auction operates as follows. Before the auction opens, the principal posts the cost function q~nmoved and the target movement vector MT to a public information area of the computer. When the auction opens, a timer is started at 60 seconds. Agents may submit asks consisting of a requested price for providing some movement vector of units. The computer determines whether this ask would be tentatively accepted or rejected and, if not rejected, reports the new ask along with the potential allocation information to all agents. At any time, agents may revise their asks in a manner that decreases the principal's cost, that is, they may offer a lower price or offer to move more units for the same price. A soft termination rule is used, similar to the going-going-gone of oral auctions: the auction continues until the timer expires, but each new ask that is included in the potential allocation resets the timer for another 60 seconds. Therefore, the auction ends when no agent submits a costimproving ask.
The following intuition plays a role in suggesting this particular auction organization. From rules 1 through 4, we see that the principal's cost function can be broken up into components according to whether movement or routing vectors are important. Details of routing are among the issues that determine transportation providers' costs, but only movement is relevant to the principal. Thus, the auction is designed to let transportation providers determine the details of routing, with competition driving these providers to select lower-cost routings over higher-cost nlternatives. Through asks, the transportation providers input the costs of movement for a computer to compare against the principal's cost of not moving units. Information needed for transportation providers to construct potentially winning asks is made available: the lower limit for a profitable ask is the transportation provider's minimum cost for moving units, which they know, while the upper limit for an ask can be determined from the competing asks and the competing alternative of the principal's unmoved cost function, which are made public information by the rules of the auction.
The soft-closure action of the timer should encourage competition and terminate the auction when no further lowering of costs is possible. (In many ways, the principal's unmoved cost function is like a set of competing asks. It is an alternative that will be adopted if transportation providers' asks are too high. An alternative auction design might keep this information secret from transportation providers, instead of revealing it as we have done. However, such a design would make it more difficult for transportation providers to submit initial asking prices. The secret unmoved cost information would also slowly leak out, as each calculation of potential allocation would reveal something to the agents about the form of the principal's cost function.)
Theoretical Benchmarks and Standards of Performance
We derive benchmarks using standard assumptions of full information and optimization on the part of agents, and thus they represent quite a challenge for a mechanism that will operate in an environment in which agents have sparsely distributed information and perhaps do not fully optimize. The benchmarks also serve as alternative models of the operations of the auction.
In order of increasing cost to the principal agent, the benchmarks include vertical integration (VI), nonlinear pricing monopsony (4P + Q), single price monopsony BREWER AND PLOTI Back Haul Traii.·I'Orlatum Problt>ms OP), competitive equilibrium (CE), and sequential contracting (SC).
We calculate the benchmarks using brute-force optimization via computer (Figures 3 through 6 and Table 3). Figure<; 3 through 6 show the costs of procuring transportation along the various routes, using some of the benchmarks shown below. Table 3 shows similar calculation<; for a nonlinear-monopsony-pricing model. In each case, these figure5 represent intermediate results that give the cost of transporting units along a particular route. We then obtain the benchmarks in Table 4 by comparing the principal's total cost over every possible movement and routing vector.
Vertical Integration
Under vertical integration, the principal P controls the transportation agents t, and therefore pays only the minimum cost of any desired transportation. Because the transportation agents operate at zero profit, the marginal procurement cost curve along a particular route is identical to the supply function for that route. The vertical integration cost benchmark is unique among the four we will use, because it is the mathematically lowest cost It is impossible to find a collection of contracts wtth lower total costs without forcing the transportation providers to operate at a loss.
Monopsony
Under monopsony, the principal P and transportation agents t; arc independent. The principal chooses the parameters of a pricing contract, and the agents decide whether to move 0, I, or more units under this contract. We consider two types of contracts, one-price (1 P) and nonlinear pricing (4P + Q).
With one-price (I P) monopsony, the principal chooses a price to pay per unit of transportation for each route, resulting in a 4-tuple of prices (PAD' P AI:.' PB 0 , P 81 ). This is called a one-price contract because there is no price discrimination over quantity moved or over individual agents. Different agents moving units on the same route receive the same price per unit moved.
With a nonlinear pricing (4P + Q) monopsony the principal chooses a vector of prices to pay for various 22 levels of transportation along each route. The name 4P Q for this benchmark indicates that the principal may choose four prices for each route, plus a quota of contracts of each type to accept along that particular route should supply exceed the principal's needs. On each particular route, a principal chooses a vector P (P(l ), P(2), P(3), P(4)) of prices to offer for moving one, two, three, or four units along that route as well as a vector of quotas Q = (Q(l), Q(2), Q(3), Q4)) of each contract type. In total, the principal chooses 16 prices, contained in the four vectors P ADr P Au P 80 , Q 8 r;, and 16 quotas, contained in four vectors QA 0 , QAEI Qao, QaE· Although the principal can engage in quantitybased price discrimination, he cannot offer different prices to agents on any other criteria.
Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium exists at the prices shown in Table 4 . In competitive equilibrium, the principal pays a single price for all units moved along a particular route. The price along a particular route is such that the principal'!> demand for transportation, as derived from marginal cost savings, exactly equals the aggregate supply of transportation, as derived from marginal transportation costs. The equilibrium shown supports the least-cost allocation of contracts. The movements of units are identical to those in least-cost vertical integration. Because the principal does not capture the transporters' surplus, the total cost to the principal is much higher than in vertical integration.
Sequential Contracting
Under sequential contracting, the principal agent P negotiates with each transportation agent in sequence. That is, first P meets with t 1 , then P meets with t 2 , and so on. At each meeting, the two agents first consider route A to D, then route A to E, then route B to D, then route B to E. For the purposes of creating a benchmark, assume that each meeting results in a contract that, based on the information available at that moment, reflects the greatest possible benefits from exchange. due to the limited and decreasing ability of the buyer to exploit market structure as we move from vertical Integration to one-price monopsony. The odd behavior of MC lor 4P and 4P + Q is due to the special feature that the MC of units 1 and 2 sum to 225 for each agent along route AD.
who have not yet been met.) Prices for transportation services need only satisfy voluntary participation, implymg that a broad range of contract prices is possible; the principal could pay as little as the transportation provider's marginal cost or as much as his entire cost savings. While there is a range of possible total costs of moving the units under this benchmark, the number of units to be moved is rigidly defined.
tial meetings. This results in much higher levels of movement than in any of the other benchmarks. Inefficiencies occur because the princ1pal does not buy strictly from the lowest-cost providers.
Under sequential contracting, because the principal faces a high initial marginal cost of unmoved units and ignores future contract possibilities in his sequential maximization, he buys too much transportation in ini- Allowing the principal to somehow renegotiate the initial contracts could increase efficiency and lower costs. This is part of what we seek to accomplish automatically by designing a smart auction. Thus, the smart auction should provide consistently lower total costs than the sequential contracting benchmarks even if it cannot attain the low costs associated with monopsony or vertical integration. (nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be accepted). Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI ... 4P + a < 4P < 1 P. Because the slope of marginal cost is higher for route AE than for other routes, the various benchmarks generally exhibit higher curvature and higher total costs.
Experimental Procedures
We conducted seven experiments w ith various parameters, time periods, and numbers of trades (Table 5) .
Instructions
In each experiment, we gave subjects detailed instructions, a cost-information sheet (essentially, each agent sees a single row from Table 1) , and forms to fill out to calculate their profits from any transportation contracts they might be awarded. (nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be accepted). Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI < 4P + a < 4P < 1P.
Laboratory Currency
All economic activity in the experiments takes place in a currency we call francs. At the end of the experiment, francs are converted to US dollars, and the subject is paid in cash in US dollars. We announce to each subject at the beginning of the experiment a franc to US dollar conversion ratio that generally yields earnings in the range of US $20-50 for each subject in the experiment. Information about conversion rates is kept private to each subject. Conversion factors vary across subjects so that a s ubject with high costs still has an incentive to participate when he or she can do so profitably. All currency figures reported in the paper arc in tcmts of the laboratory currency. These techniques date back to early market experiments of the 1970s and 1980s and BREWER AND PLOIT Back-lla111 TrmlSJ>orlallOII Probkms are now standard in most induced-value market and auction experiments.
Data Issues: Paper Versus Computer
The form of the data generated in the experiment plays a role in determining convenient forms of initial analysis. ln the experiments, we provided the subject's costs for transporting units along each route on paper, along with extra sheets for recording revenues, costs, and profits from any transportation contracts awarded during the experiment. We checked each subject's paperwork for correctness at the end of each period. The computerized data consists of all asks entered into the auction along with the final outcome.
We chose to computerize only the auction institution and not the entire experiment based on a number of trade-offs, both between programming labor and the production of experimental data, and the generality of experiments we could perform. This led to a design in which the experimental data most convenient to analy7e corresponds to the principal's point of view rather than to the transportation agent's point of view or a global point of view.
Software Issues
We tmplemented the combinatorial back-haul auction as a Web-page server system compatible with Netscape Navtgator. The experimenter ran a Web server on a computer that served as the control system, and the subjects ran copies of Netscape Navigator on standard windows-based PCs.
It can be difficult to use the Web to design interactive markets, because ordinarily Web technologies arc based on pull. That is, they retrieve information only in response to requests from users. This is a problem in a fast-·moving, continuous market, because users find it tiresome to constantly request updates to the information on their screens, and the experimenter doesn' t know what information is on each user's screen. Therefore, we had to overcome major problems to create a continuous market over the Web.
Our software was spcetally designed to take advantage of special client-pull/server-push Netscape features that continuously updated information on the (nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be accepted) Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI 4P + a < 4P 1P. Because the slope of marginal cost is lower for route BE than for other routes, the various benchmarks generally exhibit lower curvature and lower total costs. subjects' screens, rather than relying on them to request updates. Two versions of the software arc worth distinguishing.
We performed experiments 1 through 3 with version 1 of the software. In this version, subjects watched market information and submitted new asks on separate Web pages. While subjects were busy entering orders, they could not normally see other subjects' latest orders. Some subjects switched back and forth between the two Web pages, which took time, while more computer literate subjects ran two copies of the etscape program so that they could sec the latest orders in one window and enter their own orders in another.
We performed experiments 4 through 7 with version 452  461  470  479  488  479  488  479  470  524  506  524  524  515  532  532  523  523  514  514  505 with complete knowledge of the seller's marginal costs could create a pricing tariff using both nonlinear pricing and quotas and thereby obtain a total cost below the competitive and single-price monopsony outcomes. for vertical Integration, the principal will face a total cost C, of 3,374 consisting of a cost of 2,574 for moving units and a cost of 800 lor unmoved units. This least cost Is achieved when 22 units are picked up from A, and of these , 13 are delivered to 0 and nine to E: and 24 units are picked up from B with nine of these delivered to 0 and 15 to E. The totals delivered are shown In parentheses, for example, lor VI , a total of (22) units will be delivered to 0 and (24) delivered to E. Since the principal does not pay a constant price to the agents under vertical Integration, we do not report a price per unit moved. However, for the 1P and CE benchmarks, we report the relevant constant prices. Table 5 This table shows the experimental periods, their duration, and the levels of observed activity. The greater level of activity In later experiments is due to a minor software change: the first version of the software required users to change from a data screen to an order screen; the second version had an lntearated data and order screen. While one might expect that Improved order flow would cause the auction to terminate earlier, this was not the case: providing a better user Interface Increased both the order flow and the duration of the experiment.
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2 of the software. This version merged the various Web pages by using the frames feature of Netscape. Subjects could watch the activity and place new orders without switching Web pages or othenvise manipulating the computer.
This minor software change made a dramatic change in order flow and length of periods. Asks increased by a factor of two to three (Table 5 ) but did not cause the auction to end sooner.
Experimental Results
We compared the raw data for the experiments (Table  6 ) to the theoretical benchmarks (Table 4) in three areas: principal's total cost, the relationship between mo\ mg costs and unmoved costs, and the flow of units Our goal was not to falsify any of the benchmarks a<; models but simply to use them as reference points in evaluating the total costs observed in the experiments. In addition, we expect that the details of movement or routing in the benchmarks may further our understanding of the observed outcomes in the combinatorial back-haul auction experiments.
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Result 1. The total costs of procurement in the combinatorial back-haul auction tend to be (1.1) below the sequential contracting benchmark, (1.2) within 10 percent of the competitive benchmark, and (1.3) generally greater than the monopsony benchmarks and therefore greater than the minimum possible cost (Figure 7 ). Support. (1.1) Only three of 31 periods (10 percent) are above the lower range of the sequential contracting (SC) benchmark in costs. These three occur under the 30-30-30-30 target (SC benchmark cost: 7, ..!00) and are Experiment 1, Period 2 (total cost: 7,860), Experiment 3, Period 3 (total cost: 7,883) and Experiment 4, Period 1 (total cost: 8,294) . For all other cases the total cost is lower than the SC benchmark. (1.2) For the 30-30-30-30 target, of the 21 experiment-period observations, three are stnctly within the CE band of 5,642-5,985, and 15 observatwns are within 10 percent of the CE band (5, 583) . For the 30-30-20-40 target, of the 10 total obsenrations, only one is strictly within the CE band of 6,019 to 6,239, and seven are within 10 percent of the CE band (5,417 to 6,862 . .
---- Figure 7A: Figure 7 (A, B) compares the principal's total costs observed in the experiments with lour theoretical benchmarks: competitive equilibrium (CE), monopsony (1 P, 4P + Q) , and vertical Integration (VI). Figure 7A shows the experimental periods with target movements M, = (30, 30, 30, 30) . Figure 78 shows the experimental periods with target movements M,= (30, 30, 20, 40) . Note that the observed costs generally exceed the monopsony benchmarks. Costs are often closest to the CE benchmark but only occasionally fall into the exact range predicted by aCE model.
Result 2. The cost of moving units (awarded procurement contracts) versus the cost of unmoved units at the end of each experimental period tended to be most similar to the competitive benchmark. cost for unmoved units while manipulating the contract prices to achieve lowered moving costs (Figure 8 , Tables 4 and 6 ). In general, the total cost of the moving contracts tends to be near the CE benchmark with a higher cost for unmoved units moved than would be expected a t the CE. With one exception (Experiment 4 Period 1), the cost trade-off data is not at all consistent with any of the monopsony or vertical integration benchmarks. The costs of the SC benchmark are too high to describe any of the observed data and off the scale of Figure 8 . Therefore, the best candidate is the competitive benchmark. Figure BA shows the experimental periods with target movements M 1 = (30, 30, 30, 30) . Figure   88 shows the experimental periods with target movements Mr= (30, 30, 20, 40) . Each laboratory period produces a single diamond on the chart. Circles show the theoretical benchmarks: in comparison with the CE benchmark, the monopsony benchmarks (1P, 4P + 0) can be seen to accept a higher cost of unmoved units to produce greater cost reductions in the cost of moving units. We see that the trade-off achieved in the laboratory auctions (diamonds) is closer to the CE benchmark than to any of the monopsony benchmarks. The auction appears to coordinate the system towards a CE outcome, not a monopsony outcome.
benchmarks agreed best with the experimental observations regarding the flow of units in two ways: (1) averaged over all periods, the distance between the actual observations and the CE and VI benchmarks is lower than the distance between observations and the monopsony benchmarks, (2) counting periods, the CE and VI benchmarks are closer than the other benchmarks to predicting the outcome in 13 of the 21 30-30- Recall that the CE benchmark and the VI benchmark both predict that the movement of units will correspond to an efficient movement of units. Thus the flows of w1its in these benchmarks are identical even though the costs to the principal vary. 
Conclusions
We constructed a computerized procurement auction capable of handling back-haul and similar problems in the transportation of homogeneous goods when information about seller costs is limited and the number of competing sellers is limited. We developed a test bed to provide an initial challenge that any process for Table 7A : Comparison of theoretical movement benchmarks (Table 4 ) with experimental observations for the periods Involving the 30·30·30·30 target (Table 6 ) reveals that the final aggregate movements (as measured by movement vectors) are closer to the CENI benchmarks than to the others.
making back-haul decisions must solve. We designed and tested an auction using laboratory experiments with cash-motivated subjects. We compared outcomes to theoretical benchmarks from both competitive and monopsony theory with a perfectly informed buyer. The initial results are clear. Such an au ction can be constructed and successfully implemented. Our auction system produ~ed costs to the principal that were much lower than it would obtain if its agent performed the functions in-house. Even though the principal's inhouse costs were known by the bidders, the auction resulted in lower cost.
The costs of back-haul produced by the auction were lower than the negotiated-price benchmark. The backhaul costs to the principal were roughly comparable to those it would have obtained if the back-haul services 34 had been provided in a series of competitive markets in which prices were equal to the marginal cost of the service. This is remarkable since no such m.ukets existed.
The auction system did not perform as well as a perfectly informed monopsonist, who could use buying power strategically to influence prices. The combination of perfect information and buying power would require a very special set of circumstances; such a firm would have no need to consider any form of procurement other than price setting. Nevertheless, the allknowing-monopsonist measure is an objective yardstick against which we can measure the performance of a less-informed and less-powerful purchaser.
The auction would not perform as well as ;m intl .. '-gratcd firm that owns all suppliers, is fully informed about illl costs, ilnd provides itself with the services ilt the lowest possible cost. Such a buyer would be even more powerful than the perfectly informed monopso nist unless the monopsonist was able to implement perfect price discnmmiltlon. This measure reflects the best any procurement system could do, so it is a natural yardstick to apply. Results 2 ilnd 3 show that the way to understand tlus form of bilck-haul auction is by applying the competitive model. rn terms of our test-bed methodology, these results demonstrate the consistency of the de· sign. Not only did the auction work, but it worked for reasons that underlie its design. Under competitive conditwns, the purchasing firm obtains its transpor· tiltion needs at prices equal to the marginal cost of the suppliers. It is remarkable that the auction performs as predicted by the competitive model given the substantial latitude for striltegic behavior, poor coordination, and missed opportunities. From the point of view of potential users, the results suggest that the competitive model is the ilppropriilte benchmark. If analysis suggests that orgilnized competition would reduce its costs, a purchasing firm should consider replacing its current procurement method with this form of auction.
Future anulysts should take into consideratiOn the dynilmics of the process. We were primarily concerned with the outcomes at the end period-; r,1ther than with the process of achieving the outcomes. Details of the dynamics may yield insights into how to <~Iter the process. For example, an analysis of the bidding process might show a tendency towards cert<~in kinds of onestage Nash equilibrium as Brewer and Plott (1996) reported for the BICAP auction. An<~lysts could also explore aspects of procurement we did not study, such as quality of service, reliability, and timing.
Finally, we offer three general observations for those unfamiliar with experimental economics or its enwrging test-bed methodology: (1) The emerging computing and Internet infrastructure allows business to create new economic tools and processes for lowering cost or enhancing value that are more strongly tied to market or auction-like processes. (2) The test bed methodology provides a means of building <~nd testing prototypes under controlled laboratory conditions that include monetary incent1ves. A process or mechanism that performs poorly can be identified at little cost. If a process or mechanism performs well, the analyst should establish whether it performs for reusons consistent with the theories or models underpinning its design to establish principles that can yield insight into questions of scope or scale. (3) A broild range of problems can be solved. For example, the method we de-scribed would apply not only to back-haul, but to any transportation of identical goods. The methodology of test beds can be applied to virtually any economic environment that can be replicated with only a few dozen interacting agents.
